Information Inconsistencies in Smart Distribution Grids under Different Failure Causes modelled by Stochastic Activity Networks by Muka, Romina et al.
Information Inconsistencies in Smart Distribution
Grids under Different Failure Causes modelled by
Stochastic Activity Networks
Romina Muka
NTNU - Norwegian University
of Science and Technology
Trondheim, Norway
romina.muka@ntnu.no
Fredrik Bakkevig Haugli
NTNU - Norwegian University
of Science and Technology
Trondheim, Norway
fredrik.haugli@ntnu.no
Hanne Vefsnmo
SINTEF Energy Research
Trondheim, Norway
hanne.vefsnmo@sintef.no
Poul E. Heegaard
NTNU - Norwegian University
of Science and Technology
Trondheim, Norway
poul.heegaard@ntnu.no
Abstract—The ongoing digitalization of the power distribution
grid will improve the operational support and automation which
is believed to increase the system reliability. However, in an
integrated and interdependent cyber-physical system, new threats
appear which must be understood and dealt with. Of particular
concern, in this paper, is the causes of an inconsistent view be-
tween the physical system (here power grid) and the Information
and Communication Technology (ICT) system (here Distribution
Management System). In this paper we align the taxonomy
used in International Electrotechnical Commission (power eng.)
and International Federation for Information Processing (ICT
community), define a metric for inconsistencies, and present
a modelling approach using Stochastic Activity Networks to
assess the consequences of inconsistencies. The feasibility of the
approach is demonstrated in a simple use case.
Index Terms—smart grid dependability, cyber-physical system
modelling, dependability taxonomy, stochastic activity networks
I. INTRODUCTION
The pace of digitalization in energy is increasing and
is helping to improve the safety, productivity, accessibility
and sustainability of energy systems, but it is also raising
new security and privacy risks [1]. Adding more and new
Information and Communication Technology (ICT)-devices
into the electricity distribution grid and smart meters to homes,
gives opportunities to operate, plan and maintain the electricity
distribution grid smarter. New sensors and communication
equipment will give more timely and precise information
about the system state, which will enable automation, e.g., for
restoration of supply after a fault, the so-called self-healing [2].
This will result in faster restoration, shorter interruption dura-
tion, reduction in interruption cost and simplify the resource
management. It should be kept in mind that this functionality
targets the frequent occurrences, which are anticipated in the
system design.
However, this is achieved by the introduction of a new func-
tionality, partly distributed as in Intelligent Electronic Device
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(IED), and partly centralised by enhancing the surveillance
and control system (in this paper referred to as Distribution
Management System (DMS)). This increases the total com-
plexity and creates an interdependent system [3] of ICT and
power grid (PG) functionality.
Such a (cyber-physical) system will not only have additional
features, but unfortunately also new failures causes (faults),
failure modes, and failure semantics [4], [5], and they may
also manifest a more fragile behaviour in critical situations [6],
[7]. Figure 1 illustrates a risk curve where the events with
high ”probability” have low consequences, and the events with
low ”probability” have high consequences. The introduction of
the ICT-based support system, e.g., an ICT-based surveillance
and control system with distributed sensors and controllers to
operate critical infrastructure such as Smart Grid, is expected
to reduce the consequences and probability of the frequent
events. At the same time, the complexity and interdependency
in the total system will increase, with a potential increase
in the probability of critical events with extensive, and long
lasting consequences. Such events might affect large parts of
the system, and will take long time to recover from because
of the lack of understanding the complexity, or the lack of the
maintenance support and coordination between the different
subsystems and domains. As indicated in the figure, it is
not only necessary to increase the focus and manpower on
the events with larger consequences, but also increase the
competence of the operation personnel.
The novelty introduced in this paper is its focus on the
dependability [9] of a smart distribution grid, operated by the
support of an advanced surveillance and control system with
distributed sensors and controllers (IEDs). The main objective
is to investigate the causes of inconsistencies between the
state of the power grid and the state view in the DMS, and
to propose a modelling approach for assessment of these
inconsistencies.
Section II presents related work, while Section III introduces
the necessary taxonomy which includes terms from both the
ICT and PG domains. A model used to illustrate the point of
information inconsistencies is described in Section IV with
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Fig. 1. Introducing ICT operations’ support might increase the overall risk [8]
results and discussions in Section V, before the paper is
concluded in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The consequences of incorrect information in control sys-
tems have been studied primarily from the information security
point of view. Several authors have used state estimation
techniques in order to detect anomalous data injected with the
intent of causing disruptions. A review of False Data Injection
attacks against modern power systems is given in [10]. In [11],
a new architecture to provide local advanced measurement
information to the Distribution System Operator is introduced.
The Next Generation Open Real Time Smart Meter (NORM),
can be used to monitor the data grid inconsistencies to
detect cyber security threats to secure the grid operations and
continuous supply of energy to end-customers.
Several methods for cyber security risk assessment have
been proposed. In [12], a review and classification of twenty-
four methods for risk assessment methods for Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems is presented.
Other works have studied reliability assessment of smart grid
considering cyber-power interdependencies [13] and of cyber
physical distribution system [14].
In [15], Petri Nets are used to model the information flow
in a SCADA system and to analyze system for attack vectors.
The actual state of a valve and its state representation in the
SCADA system is modelled by two different places, but does
not evaluate the probability of inconsistencies.
Sensor faults are studied in [16]. The focus is on transient
sensor faults in real deployments, and four different fault de-
tection techniques were implemented. The results demonstrate
the data corruption problem, emphasizing the importance of
studying data inconsistencies to provide a high-confidence
sensor fault detection in the power grid.
Different failure modes in smart grid communication have
been investigated in [17]. The focus is on the effect of value
failures on control signals.
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Fig. 2. Inconsistencies between control view and IED state
III. FAILURE CAUSES FOR INCONSISTENCIES
The integrated ICT and PG system studied in this paper is
defined to include the DMS, the data communication network,
the software in the IEDs, and physical elements in the power
grid (e.g., breakers, power lines, disconnectors). In this section
we introduce the necessary terminology to describe the causes
of failures in such an integrated system, and the consequences
of inconsistencies between ICT view and PG state.
A. Inconsistencies between DMS view and IED state
The DMS depends on correct view of the state of physical
devices (and power flows and voltage quality). Correct state
view is crucial in order for the controller to trigger the correct
action and to change the state of the electric grid when needed,
as well as for the human operators to correctly assess the state
of the grid. In Figure 2(a) a principle sketch of the system
considered in this paper is given. Intelligent electronic devices
(IEDs) are assumed to contain sensors (s) and a controller (c),
which are interconnected and also connected to a surveillance
and control system via a data communication network. E.g.,
the state of the electronic device is observed by a sensor.
The signal is sent via the data communication network to
the surveillance and control system, which processes it and
decides whether actions need to be taken to change the state of
the electronic device (or other actions to restore power supply,
regulate voltage, change the power flow). An appropriate
control message is then sent to the IED via the same data
communication network.
Figure 2(b) shows an example of inconsistencies (in red)
between the surveillance and control view and the state of, e.g.,
a physical disconnector position of an IED. The disconnector
can be closed, while the surveillance and control system
believes it is open, and vice versa. In the following, different
causes of such inconsistencies (indicated with (2) and (3) in
the figure) are discussed.
B. Taxonomy
To describe the causes and consequences of failures, both
the power grid (IEC-60050-192) and ICT domain (IFIP WG
10.4) have defined a set of terms.
In IEC-60050-192 [9] the following terms are defined
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• Failure cause - set of circumstances that leads to failure
[IEC60050-192-03-11]
• Fault (of an item) - inability to perform as required, due
to an internal state [IEC60050-192-04-01]
• Failure (of an item) - loss of ability to perform as required
[IEC60050-192-03-01]
Correspondingly, IFIP WG 10.4 [18], [19] defines
• Fault - adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error
• Error - part of the system state which is liable to lead to
a failure
• Failure - deviation of the delivered service from com-
pliance with the specification; transition from correct
service to incorrect service (e.g., the service becomes
unavailable)
In an ICT system, the definitions of fault, error and failure
is implicitly a sequence (”pathology”) of events. Errors are ini-
tially confined within the ICT system and may be interpreted
as something wrong in the internal state of the system. When a
fault produces an error, it is said to be active. An internal fault
which has not produced errors is said to be dormant. Similarly,
an error which is not detected, is said to be latent (confer
hidden failure in next section). When the error becomes visible
at the system boundary (e.g., a system can be a sub-system
inside the ICT system), we have a failure.
Most software in today’s ICT systems is continuously
operating and has an internal state which is maintained across
several inputs (e.g., sensor data, controller commands). Ex-
amples of such systems are surveillance and control systems,
and the software logic in IEDs in the power grid. The sub-
system in the ICT part of Figure 3 is using what is referred to
as a Moore/Mealy model [20], [21] to describe the failure
mechanisms relevant to the software that is modelled in
this paper. In a Moore/Mealy model, any combination of a
wrong input signal (e.g., sensor data) (denoted (1) in blue),
a misconfiguration (2), or a faulty logic of the software (3),
will introduce an error in the state space of the software, e.g.,
an inconsistency (4) in the data of the system. This will again
lead to a wrong output signal (5) (e.g., a control command).
Note that the fault activation may be conditioned by a specific
(set of) internal states of the software, and hence, it is the
combination of the internal state and the input signal, logic,
and configuration, which causes the fault activation.
After a latency period this error may cause a failure of
the software system, and give rise to a failure that can
eventually be an ICT related power grid failure cause. The
failure (semantics) is either:
• Omission (incl. timing) failure - the signal is lost, e.g.,
sensors are not sending data or sensor data is not received,
corrupted, or delayed
• Value failure - the signal is incorrect but valid, e.g., data
from a sensor or controller is changed to a legit/valid (not
corrupted), but incorrect value
C. Failure causes
A large number of different failure causes (denoted faults
in the ICT terminology) will affect different parts of the
system in Figure 2(a). In Norway, the power system failure
causes are standardized and reported through the Norwegian
data management system, FASIT [22]. FASIT distinguish
between external and internal failure causes related to what
the grid company can control itself. In this paper we use
external and internal failure causes as follows: the external
failure causes include environment (weather-related causes),
operating stresses (stresses above critical level, e.g., excessive
load of ICT system), and human errors performed by people
outside of the organization, either (i) intended, such as ma-
licious attack and intrusion, or (ii) unintended). Environment
causes account for approximately 50% of the failures in the
Norwegian distribution grid 1-22 kV [23]. The major weather-
related causes are wind, vegetation and lightning.
The internal failure causes are related to components them-
selves or the grid or telecom operator. It includes internal fault
in an equipment (e.g. a stuck disconnector), or interaction
or operational mistakes, accidentally made by staff or hired
personnel that are operating or maintaining a system. An
internal failure is a hidden failure cause when it is dormant
and not visible until it is needed (e.g., a stuck disconnector is
not detected until it should be switched).
These failure causes are leading to permanent (solid, per-
sistent), transient (present short time) or intermittent faults
(comes and goes). A permanent fault is a fault that will remain
unless it is removed by some intervention [IEC60050-192-
04-04]. A transient fault is a fault that disappears without
intervention [IEC60050-192-04-05]. The disappearance may
be due to self-recovery. A transient fault for instance on
a power line will disappear after an automatic reclosure of
the circuit breaker. An intermittent fault is a transient fault
that recurs [IEC60050-192-04-06]. An intermittent fault can
develop into a permanent fault, e.g., a crack in an insulator
that result in flash-over in damp weather.
Design (logical) faults are human made faults during specifi-
cation, design and implementation of hardware and software.
Software faults are commonly referred to as bugs, and are
logical mistakes or inadequacy during specification design or
development, or dynamics in the deployed software processes
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described in the Moore/Mealy model above. A software bug is
either Bohrbugs (easily reproducible), Mandelbugs (seemingly
non-reproducible), and Aging-related bugs (software perfor-
mance degraded due to e.g., memory leakage, data corruption,
unreleased file locks), see [24] for more details.
IV. INTELLIGENT ELECTRONIC DEVICE MODEL
To illustrate and assess the causes of information inconsis-
tencies, a modelling approach is taken, using the Stochastic
Activity Net (SAN) formalism. This is applied to an example
with a remotely controlled disconnector, which is a rather
simple but illustrative example with only two disconnector
states (position open or closed), see Figure 2(b). We assume
that the disconnector is remotely controlled and has a sensor
that registers if the disconnector is open or closed. This model
distinguishes between the actual state of the disconnector, the
state observed by the control system (DMS) and the state
commanded by the control system. This allows the inconsis-
tencies between the true and observed state of the disconnector
to be measured. Possible sources of inconsistencies are value
failures in the sensor and communication failures, as well as
software bugs internally in the control system.
A. Stochastic Activity Net
SAN [25] is an extension to the Stochastic Petri Net
formalism, allowing more flexibility in the preconditions of
transitions (called activities), as well as the effects of a
transition. This allows for more expressive power, as well as
more compact and succinct models. The model is developed
using the Mo¨bius tool [26]. It offers a modular formalism
by defining submodels (atomic models) and composing them
to form the overall model of the system. The full model is
composed of several atomic models, each implemented as a
SAN and joined together by shared places. This makes each
part of the model easier to follow, and extend or simplify
in the future. The following sections will explain the atomic
models used to compose the full model. In general, places
with the same name are shared between the atomic models,
allowing them to see relevant portions of the state of other
atomic models.
B. DMS view and software bugs
Figure 4 shows the atomic model of the DMS view of the
disconnector. It has two states: Closed and Open. Transitions
between these states are caused either by correct operation
(the disconnector has switched state and the sensor and com-
munication system works correctly), by a value failure in the
sensor causing it to transmit the wrong state or by an internal
software bug in the DMS. The two former cases are handled
by the input gates in the model.
Note that we make no assumptions about where the moni-
toring and control system (DMS) is located. It can either be
in a central control centre, locally in the IED or anywhere
in between (substations, embedded in Platform-as-a-service
solutions in the communication infrastructure, etc).
Fig. 4. An atomic model of the DMS view
C. Sensor and communication faults
We assume that the communication infrastructure consisting
of all components required to send information between the
sensor and the DMS is either working or not, with Poisson
distributed failure and repair processes. The sensor itself may
also stop sending measurements, and it may also start to send
the wrong value (closed when the disconnector is open and
vice versa). This value failure can occur due to firmware error,
improper physical installation, calibration/configuration failure
etc. We combine the sensor and communication infrastructure
into one model with three places: OK, OmissionFailure (either
the communication or the sensor is down) or ValueFailure (the
sensor is sending incorrect but valid information). Transitions
between these places happen with exponentially distributed
intervals independently of the rest of the system. The model
is shown in Figure 5. Packet losses are not included in the
model, as we assume that the transmission protocol either
uses retransmissions on missing acknowledgement, or that
similar mechanisms are in place. The delay incurred by a
retransmission of a missing packet would be negligible on
the timescales we operate on, and is therefore omitted.
Fig. 5. An atomic model of sensor and communication
D. Faults in the disconnector
In order to include the possibility of the disconnector
not responding, faults in the physical disconnector are also
included in the model. In reality, this can for example be due to
welding of the contactors, bad connection in the control signal
or a software bug in the firmware that causes the disconnector
to not react to commands.
This failure model is shown in Figure 6. Initially, the Dis-
connectorOK-place is marked, meaning that the disconnector
works as it should. After an exponentially distributed interval,
a transition moves the token to the Stuck-place. This means
that the disconnector is stuck without anyone knowing, as we
can only discover that it is stuck once it is attempted to operate
it. The disconnector has a so-called hidden fault, as defined
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Fig. 6. An atomic model of the physical status of the disconnector
in Section III-C. When an opening or closing operation is
attempted, the token is moved to the Stuck detected-place.
Here, the operators are aware of the problem and will initiate
repair, and the token returns to the DisconnectorOK-place after
an exponentially distributed repair time.
E. Actual state of the disconnector
An atomic model is developed for showing the actual
state of the disconnector, closed or open represented by two
places Real Closed and Real Open respectively, as shown in
Figure 7. Transitions between these two places are caused
by commands sent by the DMS when the sensor and com-
munication is working, so there are no omission failures
(see Figure 5), and in addition the physical status of the
disconnector is not stuck (see Figure 6). Real opening and
Real closing places are introduced in this atomic model to
describe the fact that the disconnector might be stuck while
attempted to operate it (see Section IV-D).
Fig. 7. An atomic model of the actual state of the disconnector
F. Disconnector commands
A simple atomic model has been created for the issuing
of commands to open and close the disconnector with an
exponetially distributed interval. A close-command is only sent
when the DMS sees the disconnector as open and vice versa.
Note that we make no assumption of what is the reason to
close or open the disconnector. Possible reasons can be fault
clearing, maintenance, rerouting of power etc.
V. RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS
To study the effects of the physical disconnector faults,
sensor and communication faults, and software bugs in the
DMS, a simulation study is conducted for measuring the
information inconsistencies between the DMS view and the
IED state. The metric that is used in this paper is sensing
inconsistency, which is the (stationary) probability that the
observed state of a device deviates from the real state of
the same device. In the example in this paper, the device
is a disconnector. This is measured as the portion of time
when there was an inconsistency between the states Open and
Real Open or Closed and Real Closed in the models of DMS
view (Figure 4) and actual state (Figure 7) of the disconnector.
A. Model parameters
The values of the different intensities are presented in
Table I, hereafter referred to as the base scenario.
TABLE I
BASE SCENARIO PARAMETERS
Parameter Description Value
1/λdgs mean time to disconnector getting stuck 12 months
1/µdgs mean time to stuck diconnector repaired 4 hours
1/λswc mean time to SW bug to closed 12 months
1/λswo mean time to SW bug to open 12 months
1/λv mean time to next value failure 6 months
1/µv mean time to value repair 5 minutes
1/λo mean time to next omission failure 6 months
1/µo mean time to omission repair 30 minutes
1/λocmd mean time to next open command 6 months
1/µccmd mean time to next close command 2 days
As these types of systems are not currently widely deployed,
there is little available statistics to gather realistic parameters.
These numbers are chosen as a base line. A sensitivity analysis
was performed and described in Section V-B to determine
which parameters had the most impact on the measured
inconsistency, and should be investigated more in further work.
As systems generally can be made more reliable by invest-
ing (wisely) more money, one use of this model can be to
evaluate how reliable the sensors need to be to ensure a given
probability of consistent information.
B. Sensitivity analysis
In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis to determine
which of the parameters have the highest impact on the
information inconsistency. For each simulation, we vary one
parameter by multiplying it with a scaling factor of 10 and
0.1, respectively, while keeping the rest of the parameters the
same as defined in the base scenario. The results, sorted by
the impact of the varied parameter in decreasing order, are
presented in Figure 8.
Fig. 8. Sensitivity analysis of the information inconsistency
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The base line result is an information inconsistency of
2 × 10−5. This corresponds to an expected information in-
consistency of around 10 minutes per year. It is marked with
the vertical black line. The orange and blue bars show the
result of scaling each parameter with 10 and 0.1 respectively.
C. Discussion
The most important parameters are value failure and repair
rates. This is to be expected, as they directly influence the
correctness of the measurement. The other significant param-
eter is the get stuck repair rate of the disconnector when it
is decreased. This is due to the fact that the sensor will not
report its state correctly when the disconnector is under repair.
If there is a software bug in the DMS during this time, it will
not be corrected until the repair is done.
The rest of the factors have negligible effect on the result.
The omission failures will not contribute much to information
inconsistencies as the system will not change state when the
communication system is down. In future work it would be
interesting to introduce operation of the disconnector that
was not caused by the system. Under this circumstance, an
omission failure would likely lead to the state change not being
observed in the DMS.
It is interesting to note that the parameters related to
software bugs in the DMS does not effect the information
inconsistency. This is likely due to the error being corrected
immediately. We have assumed that the disconnectors send
their status continuously with some short interval, unless the
disconnector is being repaired. If this was not the case, and
the disconnectors only sent messages when the state changed,
we might see a bigger impact from these internal bugs.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The modelling approach proposed in this paper specifically
focuses on assessment of causes of information inconsistencies
between observed (in DMS) and real state of physical devices
(e.g., a disconnector). Stochastic Activity Network has been
used to model a simple example with a remotely controlled
disconnector. A sensitivity analysis has been performed to
identify the most critical parameters affecting this inconsis-
tency. The study has shown the direct and high impact of
value failures, i.e., sensor or controller data which are valid but
wrong. We have also observed that software bugs in the DMS,
have minor effect on inconsistency if continuous disconnector
status updates are received. The model is flexible and can be
scaled up to assess systems consisting of several IEDs, and
add different failure modes and causes.
REFERENCES
[1] International Energy Agency, Digitalization and Energy. IEA, 2017.
[2] P. L. Cavalcante, J. C. Lopez, J. F. Franco, M. J. Rider, A. V. Garcia,
M. R. Malveira, L. L. Martins, and L. C. M. Direito, “Centralized self-
healing scheme for electrical distribution systems,” IEEE Transactions
on Smart Grid, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 145–155, 2015.
[3] M. Heller, “Interdependencies in civil infrastructure systems,” The
Bridge, vol. 31, no. 4, 2001.
[4] D. Kirschen and F. Bouffard, “Keeping the lights on and the information
flowing,” IEEE Power and Energy Magazine, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 50–60,
Jan. 2009.
[5] S. Rinaldi, J. Peerenboom, and T. Kelly, “Identifying, understanding,
and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies,” IEEE Control
Systems, vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 11–25, Dec. 2001.
[6] S. V. Buldyrev, R. Parshani, G. Paul, H. E. Stanley, and S. Havlin,
“Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks,” Nature,
vol. 464, no. 7291, pp. 1025–1028, Apr. 2010.
[7] R. G. Morris and M. Barthelemy, “Interdependent networks: the fragility
of control,” Scientific Reports, vol. 3, 2013.
[8] P. E. Heegaard, B. E. Helvik, G. Nencioni, and J. Wa¨fler,
Managed Dependability in Interacting Systems. Cham: Springer
International Publishing, 2016, pp. 197–226. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30599-8 8
[9] I. E. Commission, “Electropedia: The World’s Online Electrotechnical
Vocabulary - Dependability (IEC-60050-192).” [Online]. Available:
http://www.electropedia.org/iev/iev.nsf/index?openform&part=192
[10] G. Liang, J. Zhao, F. Luo, S. R. Weller, and Z. Y. Dong, “A review
of false data injection attacks against modern power systems,” IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 1630–1638, July 2017.
[11] M. Sanduleac, G. Lipari, A. Monti, A. Voulkidis, G. Zanetto, A. Corsi,
L. Toma, G. Fiorentino, and D. Federenciuc, “Next generation real-
time smart meters for ict based assessment of grid data inconsistencies,”
Energies, vol. 10, no. 7, p. 857, 2017.
[12] Y. Cherdantseva, P. Burnap, A. Blyth, P. Eden, K. Jones, H. Soulsby,
and K. Stoddart, “A review of cyber security risk assessment methods
for scada systems,” Computers & security, vol. 56, pp. 1–27, 2016.
[13] B. Falahati, Y. Fu, and L. Wu, “Reliability assessment of smart grid
considering direct cyber-power interdependencies,” IEEE Transactions
on Smart Grid, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 1515–1524, 2012.
[14] J. Liu, D. Wang, C. Zhang, Z. Tang, Z. Jiang, J. Liu, and Y. Xiang,
“Reliability assessment of cyber physical distribution system,” Energy
Procedia, vol. 142, pp. 2021–2026, 2017.
[15] M. H. Henry, R. M. Layer, K. Z. Snow, and D. R. Zaret, “Evaluating
the risk of cyber attacks on scada systems via petri net analysis with
application to hazardous liquid loading operations,” in 2009 IEEE
Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security. IEEE, 2009, pp.
607–614.
[16] A. B. Sharma, L. Golubchik, and R. Govindan, “Sensor faults: Detection
methods and prevalence in real-world datasets,” ACM Transactions on
Sensor Networks (TOSN), vol. 6, no. 3, p. 23, 2010.
[17] T. Amare and B. E. Helvik, “Dependability analysis of smart distribution
grid architectures considering various failure modes,” in 2018 IEEE PES
Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe (ISGT-Europe),
Oct 2018, pp. 1–6.
[18] “IFIP Working Group 10.4 on Dependable Computing and Fault
Tolerance.” [Online]. Available: http://www.dependability.org/wg10.4/
[19] A. Avizienis, J. C. Laprie, B. Randell, and C. Landwehr, “Basic concepts
and taxonomy of dependable and secure computing,” IEEE Transaction
on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 1, pp. 11–33, 2004.
[20] E. F. Moore, “Gedanken-experiments on sequential machines,” in Au-
tomata studies. Princeton University press, 1956, pp. 129 –153.
[21] G. H. Mealy, “A method for synthesizing sequential circuits,” Bell
System Technical Journal, vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 1045–1079, 1955.
[Online]. Available: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/j.
1538-7305.1955.tb03788.x
[22] J. Heggset and G. Kjolle, “Experiences with the fasit reliability data
collection system,” in 2000 IEEE Power Engineering Society Winter
Meeting. Conference Proceedings (Cat. No. 00CH37077), vol. 1. IEEE,
2000, pp. 546–551.
[23] G. Kjølle, H. Vefsnmo, and J. Heggset, “Reliability data management by
means of the standardised fasit-system for data collection and reporting,”
in Proc. CIRED, vol. 2015, 2015.
[24] K. S. Trivedi and A. Bobbio, Reliability and Availability Engineering:
Modeling, Analysis, and Applications. Cambridge University Press,
2017.
[25] W. H. Sanders and J. F. Meyer, Stochastic Activity Networks:
Formal Definitions and Concepts. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2001, pp. 315–343. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44667-2\ 9
[26] S. Gaonkar, K. Keefe, R. Lamprecht, E. Rozier, P. Kemper, and W. H.
Sanders, “Performance and dependability modeling with mo¨bius,” ACM
SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 16–
21, 2009.
6
